On law books, legal science, and legal dogmatics; 1. Legal dogmatics as a system of statements on the meaning of the law; 2. Kelsen’s concept of legal science; 2.1. Legal science as a system of descriptive, indicative statements; 2.2. Legal science as a system of descriptive, indicative statements on the whole of the law; 2.3. Legal science’s concept of coherence; 3. Troper’s distinction between legal science and legal dogmatics; 4. A
critique of Kelsen’s concept of legal science; 4.1. On the constitutive character of legal science’s epistemic coherence; 4.2. On the teleological character of legal science’s epistemic coherence; 5. A critique of Troper’s
distinction between legal science and legal dogmatics; 5.1. On the practical, “applicative†character of the scientific statements; 5.2. On the scientific character of practical, “applicative†statements; 6. Legal dogmatics’ comparative and historical components; 7. Legal dogmatics as a source of the law.
