Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn

Brazilian Political Science Review

Avenida Professor Luciano Gualberto, 315 - Cidade Universitária
São Paulo / SP
Telefone: (11) 3091-3780
ISSN: 19813821
Editor Chefe: Adrian Gurza Lavalle
Início Publicação: 31/12/2006
Periodicidade: Quadrimestral
Área de Estudo: Ciência política

Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn

Ano: 2019 | Volume: 13 | Número: 1
Autores: Fabiano Santos, Acir Almeida, Thiago Moreira da Silva
Autor Correspondente: Fabiano Santos | [email protected]

Palavras-chave: Capital mobility, Latin America, Left turn, Redistribution, Social spending, Veto player

Resumos Cadastrados

Resumo Inglês:

This article offers an explanation for the intensity of redistributive policies from Latin American leftist governments during the so-called ‘left turn’. It challenges the idea that the recent radical leftist governments are the product of region-specific characteristics. Based on theoretical models that analyze the implications of inequality in democracies and the moderating effects of different economic and institutional structures, it argues instead that the left’s redistributive policies were more intense in countries where capital mobility is low and there was no pro-elite legislative veto player. To evaluate this explanation, we offer original evidence from time-series -cross-section regression models of social spending, based on data from thirteen Latin American countries over the years 2003 to 2015. The results show partial support for the explanation: there is strong evidence that social spending decreased with the ideological distance between the president and the pro-elite veto player, but only weak evidence that capital mobility attenuated this effect.