A consciência de si como sujeito
Kant e-prints
A consciência de si como sujeito
Autor Correspondente: R. H. de S. Pereira | [email protected]
Palavras-chave: self-consciousness, subject, apperception.
Resumos Cadastrados
Resumo Inglês:
In this paper, I present a new interpretation for Kant’s notion of a consciousness of oneself as Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse (Longuenesse, 2006). My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without a conceptual content and without any structure. It makes the subject aware only in the limited sense of demonstratively representing of what appears to him. In the sequence, I present a reading of empirical consciousness as the result of a first-order representation. The important introduction of §16 of the first Critique <KrV> is construed here as expressing what is known today as the access consciousness. Lastly, I propose a new reading for the transcendental Apperception as an intransitive form of consciousness.
