Este ensaio busca oferecer uma coleção de materiais historiográficos, em sua maior parte traduzidos do alemão, a bem da contextualização mais detalhada do papel de Moisés Mendelssohnno debate filosófico alemão da segunda metade do XVIII, em especial no que concerne à provável influência de suas reflexões em Kant e Hegel. Inicio com(1) a consideração das novidades trazidas à tona por M. Serresno que concerne à interpretação de Leibniz, e o faço com o intuito de introduzir em sentido amplo a problemática da característica universal, que servirá de fio condutor neste percurso. Tal introdução me permite definir (2) alguns dos termos mediante os quais observaremos o debate entre Kant e Mendelssohn, a começar com a análise (3, 4) de alguns aspectos do concurso sobre a cientificidade da metafísica proposto pela Academia de Ciências da Prússia em 1762, e em seguida com a observação (5, 6), mesmo que sumária, de alguns outros momentos importantes do contato entre ambos os filósofos. Meu objetivo é ilustrar a posição mendelssohniana, mesmo que de maneira introdutória, no intuito de se lançar alguma luz sobre seu projeto crítico de impor limites à razão teórica da matemática clássica e à razão prática da mística cabalística –diapasão em que se exercita a mágica e o fascínio do ideário da característica universal –o que promete, por sua vez, iluminar tanto alguns aspectos fundamentais do projeto da Crítica da Razão Purade Kant quanto da Ciênciada Lógicade Hegel. À guisa de conclusão (7) relatarei, mesmo que de maneira episódica e sumária, aspectos da querela do panteísmoe indicaremos brevemente como Kant e Hegel, de maneiras opostas, a ela reagiram.This essay searches to offer a large array of historiographic material so as to allow a more detailed contextualization of the role Moses Mendelssohn played in the classic German philosophical debate, especially in what concerns the probable influence of his reflections in Kant and Hegel. I start off (1) by taking into account some novelties brought to light in 1968 by M. Serrespertaining to the interpretation of Leibniz’ philosophy, and this in order to introduce in general terms the questions orbiting around the idea of the caracteristica universalis, which heretofore shall be our guiding thread. Such an introduction allows meto determine (2) some of the terms by which I will observe the debate between Kant and Mendelssohn: at first through the analysis (3, 4) of some aspects of the 1762 Preissfrage of the Prussian Academy of Sciences focusing the scientific status of metaphysics; and then (5, 6) by the summary observation of other important exchanges between Mendelssohn and Kant. My objective, thus, is to illustrate Mendelssohn’s positions, even if only in an introductory fashion, so as to throw some light onto his critical project of imposing limits to classical mathematics’ theoretical reason and to cabalistic mystique’s practical reason –precisely the field wherein the caracteristica worked out its magic and fascination. This illustrationpromises on its turn to throw new light onto some founding aspects both of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reasonand Hegel’s Science of Logic. By way of conclusion, I shall relate, again in an episodic and summary fashion, some aspects pertaining to the Pantheismusstreitand how Kant and Hegel reacted differently to it.
This essay searches to offer a large array of historiographic material so as to allow a more detailed contextualization of the role Moses Mendelssohn played in the classic German philosophical debate, especially in what concerns the probable influence of his reflections in Kant and Hegel. I start off (1) by taking into account some novelties brought to light in 1968 by M. Serrespertaining to the interpretation of Leibniz’ philosophy, and this in order to introduce in general terms the questions orbiting around the idea of the caracteristica universalis, which heretofore shall be our guiding thread. Such an introduction allows meto determine (2) some of the terms by which I will observe the debate between Kant and Mendelssohn: at first through the analysis (3, 4) of some aspects of the 1762 Preissfrage of the Prussian Academy of Sciences focusing the scientific status of metaphysics; and then (5, 6) by the summary observation of other important exchanges between Mendelssohn and Kant. My objective, thus, is to illustrate Mendelssohn’s positions, even if only in an introductory fashion, so as to throw some light onto his critical project of imposing limits to classical mathematics’ theoretical reason and to cabalistic mystique’s practical reason –precisely the field wherein the caracteristica worked out its magic and fascination. This illustrationpromises on its turn to throw new light onto some founding aspects both of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reasonand Hegel’s Science of Logic. By way of conclusion, I shall relate, again in an episodic and summary fashion, some aspects pertaining to the Pantheismusstreitand how Kant and Hegel reacted differently to it.
