This article proceeds from the premise that, even if you accept the principle
that justice is impossible in the complete absence of virtue, a good political system
ought to be parsimonious in any requirement of virtue as an input, so as not to
impose undue restrictions on its own ability to function. Assuming a more or less
random distribution of virtue through time and space, it would be preferable, all
other things being equal, to have a system equipped to operate not only in periods
of abundant moral and ethical virtue, but also — and particularly — in periods of
scarcity, when such qualities seem depleted in human nature. This exigency grows
critical in the context of a modern society, in which the ever-increasing complexity
and impersonal nature of social relations will produce anonymity that would urge
extreme caution in the presumption of virtue as an element of social relations — a
caution that sociology unanimously teaches us. In such a context — one in which
not all issues will involve everyone equally, nor will all voices be always audible —
prudence advises and tolerance demands that political apathy — or, rather, mere
abstention — should be recognized, if not as a new modality of virtue, at least as a
basic right: in the exercise of which, I will respectfully silence myself whenever
appropriate before the judgment of actors more intensely immersed than I, and let
myself hope for silence from a few so as to be heard when I see fit to express
myself.