Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory Agencies

Brazilian Political Science Review

Endereço:
Avenida Professor Luciano Gualberto, 315 - Cidade Universitária
São Paulo / SP
Site: https://brazilianpoliticalsciencereview.org/
Telefone: (11) 3091-3780
ISSN: 19813821
Editor Chefe: Adrian Gurza Lavalle
Início Publicação: 31/12/2006
Periodicidade: Quadrimestral
Área de Estudo: Ciência política

Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory Agencies

Ano: 2011 | Volume: 5 | Número: 2
Autores: Mariana Batista da Silva
Autor Correspondente: Mariana Batista da Silva | [email protected]

Palavras-chave: Delegation, independence, regulation, political interference

Resumos Cadastrados

Resumo Inglês:

Is there Executive interference in the regulatory agencies after its formal establishment as independent bodies? Under what conditions the Executive chooses to interfere in the agencies? This paper analyses the degree of interference in Brazilian national regulatory agencies and provide a tentative explanation for the variation in the degree of interference. The basic hypotheses is that credibility costs, the degree of formal independence and the preferences of presidents are crucial factors affecting the extent to which presidents interfere in the regulatory process. A random effects model is estimated with panel data for the period between 1997 and 2008 covering ten national agencies. The degree of interference is operationalized by an index built using factor analysis. The data suggest that there is political interference, which varies across agencies and over time. The results show that the preferences of the president and some issue area specificity matters for the choice that presidents make regarding the interference in the regulatory process.