O moralmente bom e o moralmente mau em Kant: uma discussão com Zeljko Loparic

Ano: 2010 | Volume: 5 | Número: 3

Autores: A. Pavão

Palavras-chave: radical evil, freedom, moral judgement, Maxim, Gesinnung.

Resumo Inglês:

In the Zeljko Loparic ́s article "Kantian solution of the fundamental problem of religion" (2008), heconnect the originality of the doctrine of radical evil to the anthropological inflection of practice Kantianphilosophy, whose culminating reflection would be presented in the Doctrine of Virtue and Anthropology from aPragmatic Point of View. However, the discussion that I intend to do, with the interpretation offered by Loparicon Kantian doctrine of radical evil, has a more restricted purpose. I intend to focus on the following problem: inthe Kant’s moral philosophy, the question of whether the moral evil refers essentially to the particular maxims orto the man’s character involves the difficulty on the relationship among Gesinnung, fundamental maxim andparticular maxims. This difficulty can give rise to the claim that the fundamental maxim can not be the focus toassert the moral quality of actions, since it indicates a general plan of the particular maxim, while the moralquality of actions seems to depend more on particular maxim rather than fundamental maxim. According toLoparic, Kant argues in Religion the thesis that predicates morally good and morally bad should be appliedprimarily to man, ie the person's character. Thus, the question arises: what exactly is the target of ascription ourmoral judgements? Now, we can’t judge directly the man’s character, that is to say, we do not say that a man isgood or evil because of an isolated action. So, what is the base to state that a man is evil? It will also benecessary to discuss if what the Religion offers, or suggests to offer, represents an alternative view, or isconsistent with what we have learned about the moral evaluation in the Groundwork and Critique of PracticalReason. I defend that Religion represents an alternative view.