A consciência de si como sujeito

Kant e-prints

Endereço:
Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência (CLE), Rua Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, Nº 251 - Cidade Universitária
Campinas / SP
13083-859
Site: https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/index
Telefone: (19) 3521-6520
ISSN: 1677-163X
Editor Chefe: Daniel Omar Perez
Início Publicação: 01/01/2002
Periodicidade: Quadrimestral
Área de Estudo: Ciências Humanas

A consciência de si como sujeito

Ano: 2009 | Volume: 4 | Número: 2
Autores: R. H. de S. Pereira
Autor Correspondente: R. H. de S. Pereira | [email protected]

Palavras-chave: self-consciousness, subject, apperception.

Resumos Cadastrados

Resumo Inglês:

In this paper, I present a new interpretation for Kant’s notion of a consciousness of oneself as Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse (Longuenesse, 2006). My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without a conceptual content and without any structure. It makes the subject aware only in the limited sense of demonstratively representing of what appears to him. In the sequence, I present a reading of empirical consciousness as the result of a first-order representation. The important introduction of §16 of the first Critique <KrV> is construed here as expressing what is known today as the access consciousness. Lastly, I propose a new reading for the transcendental Apperception as an intransitive form of consciousness.